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NATURAL LAW IN DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AND
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN GERMANY*
Heinrich Rommen
POSITIVISM WITH ITS THESIS that "law is law" has made German jurists and
lawyers defenseless against laws of arbitrary or criminal content. Positivism
simply holds that a law is valid because it is successfully enforced.' "Any
legislative act is unconditionally binding upon the judge." 2 This was the po-
sition taken by one of the most respected (and most influential) commenta-
tors on the Weimar Constitution. A great majority, though in the last years
a dwindling majority, of his colleagues agreed with him. They were also in-
clined to contend that some parts of the Bill of Rights contained in the Con-
stitution itself - especially those which, like the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, provided for further implementation by the
legislature - were not in themselves positive rights to be protected by the
courts but merely "directives" or "programs" for the legislature. Thus some
commentators held that Article 109, which provides that all Germans are
equal before the law, was binding only on the administration (Verwaltung)
and the judiciary, but not on the legislature, the latter being free to protect
existing special privileges and to introduce new ones. Some held that this ar-
ticle was no legal norm at all. One called it wholly meaningless. 3 In his wide-
ly used smaller commentary Gerhard Anschiitz says that those who see in this
article a rule of law and not merely a well-sounding claim are influenced by
value judgments based on American and Swiss constitutional law;4 if Triepel,
for instance, speaks of "legislative absolutism" then it must be said that judi-
cial review after the American pattern establishes simply another kind of ab-
solutism. Needless to say, Anschiitz strongly opposed any form of judicial re-
view of the legislature.
* This study was made possible by a grant of the American Philosophical Society for which
the author expresses his gratitude.
PRELIMINARY REMARK: In German, the term "Naturrecht" includes those rules of the
broader natural law or "natiirliches Sittengesetz" which concern human living together,
i.e., the political community and its common good of which the basic human rights, for
instance, are a vital part.
1. GUSTAV RADBRUCa, RECHTSPHILOSOPHiE 352 (4th ed. by Erik Wolf, 1950).
2. GERHARD ANSCHUTZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 279 (1929).
3. A. VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN, WEIMARER VERFASSUNG 295 (1924).
4. Op. cit. supra, note 2 at 305 ff.
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Similarly, Article 113, concerning the protection of national minorities
and their right to the use of their language in education and in administra-
tive agencies and courts, was declared to be merely a directive for the legis-
lature, not an immediately applicable rule for the courts. No individual rights
could be derived from it, because individual rights against the legislature were
unthinkable. 5 Thus there prevailed a tendency in stark opposition to Ameri-
can and Swiss constitutional doctrine, a tendency to see in the typical provi-
sions of the classical Bill of Rights no limitation on the legislature. 6 Judicial
review as it developed in the United States was unacceptable to most com-
mentators. In their view, the judiciary was permitted only to decide whether
laws had been correctly passed and promulgated in accordance with the rules
for the legislative process; whether the substantive content conformed to such
criteria as justice, liberty, reasonableness, and nonarbitrariness was excluded
from judicial inquiry.
The roots of this doctrine are partly historical, partly philosophical. To
the first category belongs the tradition of absolutism, which gave the King the
right to intervene in any case before a court and to decide it on his own au-
thority (Kabinettsjustiz), as well as the rule that the courts were not permit-
ted to interpret independently the codes of law (which were issued frequently
under the absolute monarchies) but had to have recourse to the "Legislative
Commission" to ascertain the will of the legislator. 7 Under the influence of
more or less rationalistic conceptions of law and of the all-comprehensive sys-
tematic code, the judge, as a civil servant wholly subordinate to the absolute
king, became an automaton-like being, as Duguit said, or a "slave of the
Law." 8 Under these conditions one need not wonder that the rising liberal-
democratic movements thought little about the judiciary as a possible guardian
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
These movements, following the thinking of the French rather than of the
American Revolution, put their trust in the legislature as a limitation upon
the constitutional monarch. The experiments made with "constitutional
courts" or Staatsgerichtshfe were, even under the Weimar Republic, more
concerned with the competencies of the various branches of the government
or with those of federal and state government than they were with substantive
values and basic human rights.
Meanwhile, from the middle of the nineteenth century on, legal positivism
5. ANSCHUTZ, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 94, 96.
6. It should not be forgotten that, from the middle of the twenties, a contrary doctrine
gained some influence under Triepel, Leibholz, Nawiasky, Kaufmann.
7. FRANZ W. JERUSALEM, DIE STAATSOERICHTSBARKEIT 28 (Tiibingen, 1930). A special
order of the King of Bavaria forbade any commentaries on the Criminal Code of 1813. Ibid.
8. Paul Bokelmann, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR RUDOLF SMEND 27 (Gbttingen, 1952).
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was gaining more and more primacy. Under this doctrine - branching off
from general philosophical positivism - jus (Recht), especially any kind of
judge-made jus, is pushed into the background; and lex - the formal law, the
product of the legislative majority - gains absolute control. The judiciary is
not - and does not consider itself to be - an equal of the legislature. Dr.
Hermann Weinkauff, once a member of the old German Supreme Court
(Reichsgericht) and now Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, states
of the former that it
followed in its whole jurisdiction the tradition of not touching the philo-
sophical fundamental principles of law that lay at the basis of positive law.
It did not take a position here but limited itself to a reasonable applica-
tion to the individual case of the positive legislative law which it accepted
without critical tests. . . . Such a tradition presupposes that the positive
law... self-evidently stays within the underlying order of justice and also
that in any civic society certain fundamental principles of law and ethics
are universally and indubitably though perhaps only tacitly accepted as
valid.9
Only under such a presupposition could the Reichsgericht in the compara-
tively calm days of the middle twenties say: "The legislator is sovereign
[selbstherrlich], not bound by any limitations except those that he has imposed
upon himself in the Constitution or in other laws." 10 It was due to essentially
transitory conditions that legal positivism, itself part and parcel of a general
positivism in philosophy and ethics, was able to persist. The civil society of
the time, in spite of a widespread relativism, still rested securely on a general
consensus as to a traditionally or de facto accepted hierarchy of values in
state and society.
It is scarcely surprising that under these partly historical, partly philo-
sophical conditions the judiciary could not claim substantive review of the legis-
latures. It could not become the "guardian of the Constitution" as the Higher
Law, nor would the people see in the judiciary the protector of the Bill of
Rights. Though the Reichsgericht seems to have claimed in two decisions a
9. Chief Justice Weinkauff, a staunch defender of natural law, speaks of the Ur-Rechts-
ordnung, by which he means the natural law. Cf. his contribution on the question of re-
sistance against tyranny: DI VOLLMACHT DES GEWISSENS part I (Bonn, 1956); and IUBER
DAS WIDERSTANDSRECHT 13, 16 (Karlsruhe, 1956), where the UR-RECHTSORDNUNG is de-
fined as suprapositive legal order higher than positive law, valid by itself, i.e., an order of
natural law. The quotation is taken from 75 JAHRE REicHSJUSTIZGESETZE 49 ff. (Bonn,
1954).
10. 118 ENTSCHEMUNGEN DES REiCHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN (hereafter quoted as
RGZ) 327. It should be remembered that in most continental constitutions the amending
power rests with the ordinary legislatures, the only difference being that a qualified majority
of a qualified quorum decides.
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right to review, it is still debated among jurists whether it actually did so.11
In any event, the Reichsgericht never rendered a decision comparable to Mar-
bury v. Madison. Even had it done so, it could never have established a doc-
trine with one or two cases, since the rule of precedent is unknown in German
law.
Later, the traditional consensus, more implicit than explicit, more sensed
than rationally and critically evaluated, began to give way more and more
under the impact of great social upheavals of the masses - anxieties caused
by frustrated longings for status and security during a demoralizing economic
depression. When that happened, the socio-political cohesion, the public or-
der and peace, began to diminish also, and antagonistic class tendencies began
to threaten civil war. If civil war was to be avoided, the only way out was
a legal, yet revolutionary, change of the socio-political status quo. Whatever
the underlying longings for greater social justice, for a more perfect realiza-
tion of human rights, they are for the legal positivist matters of indifference;
he is satisfied if the change is legal, he is less interested in the moral values, in
search of their more perfect concretization. Now Hitler - who had an un-
canny flair for recognizing both the indistinct longings of the masses and the
respect of officers, civil servants, and jurists for legality, however lacking in
substantive legitimacy - staged just such a "legal" revolution (a wit called
him Adolf Legalit6) and thus he disarmed intellectually all those who adhered
to legal positivism. Hitler even got legally the power to create new constitu-
tional law, first qualified by some formalities, e.g., that the cabinet or council
of ministers must consent, but ultimately issuing in the rule that solely the
will of the Fifhrer promulgated in the Reichsanzeiger makes the law. Toward
the end of the war even that formality was dropped. The judiciary, purged
of all open opponents of the regime, whose seats then were taken by trust-
worthy adherents, had, under this paroxysm of positivism, to restrict itself -
if we except civil, commercial, and the politically irrelevant parts of criminal
law - to the menial task of acknowledging the legality of all acts of the
Fiihrer and his underlings. For under the rule that the Fiihrer's will uttered
with a minimum of form is the law, the role of the judiciary was that of an
automaton. Or individual judges could defy the regime - as not a few did
- and die as martyrs to their high vocation.
11. See the elaborate discussion in RICHARD THOMA and ERNST VON HIPPEL, 2 HANDBUCH
DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, where Thoma argues against and von Hippel in favor of
"judicial review." The cases referred to are found in 102 RGZ 164; 111 RGZ 322. Cf.
the resolution of the Association of the Judges of the Reichsgericht of January, 1924, asking
that it declare void an act contrary to the principle of good faith. Paul Bokelman, op. cit.
supra, note 8 at 31.
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II
It is understandable that under the intellectual and constitutional condi-
tions of the Empire and the Weimar Republic - not to speak of those of the
Hitler regime - the courts did not introduce considerations of natural law.
The prevailing doctrines admitted neither a truly independent and equal judi-
cial power of government nor a "Recht" broader than the formal law issuing
from the legislature; still less did they accept a basic idea of justice and equity
as superior to all positive law. It is understandable, too, that judicial review
of legislation, which could have opened the way to natural law, did not find
full acceptance, and that the proponents of judicial review were often, though
not always, open to the theory of natural law. This does not mean that one
will not find during this time traces of natural law in court decisions. The
so-called general clauses, especially the references in the Civil Code to "gute
Sitten," or "Treu und Glauben," and the necessity for judicial determination
of certain socio-economic conflicts 12 opened opportunities to introduce argu-
ments and opinions with a natural law orientation. On the whole, however,
the prevailing intellectual climate of legal positivism stood in the way of an
open acknowledgment of the suprapositive norms of natural law.
With the Gitterdiimmerung in May, 1945, there fell what many jurists
had regarded as a "regime of systematic injustice," a regime which had taught
ad hominem the necessity of universal higher standards of objectively valid
suprapositive principles for the lawmaker. Accordingly, from the middle of
1946 on, a revival of natural law thinking took hold of the intellectual world,
especially the jurists and the members of the constituent assemblies of the
Ldnder. Or, more correctly, this revival began to manifest itself publicly.
Naturally the "system of injustice" had produced conversions, as it were, to
natural law much earlier; but the Nazi authorities would not permit an open
discussion.1 3 At the same time, all attempts at passive and active resistance
to the regime were necessarily grounded on natural law ideas or on divine
law, for legal positivism as such could offer no foundation. This has been
brought out in numerous publications since the war.14 It was a favorable cir-
cumstance, too, that Protestant theologians - not so much of course Karl
12. Cf. Fritz Baur, Sozialer Ausgleich durch Richterspruch, 12 JURISTENZEITUNO 193-194
(1957), who points out that economic conflicts of interest produced by the runaway infla-
tion after World War I gave the judges an opportunity which they, of course, used to decide
such conflicts ex aequo et bono.
13. The writer's book on natural law (first edition) was published in 1936, but the pub-
lisher was forbidden to advertise it and booksellers could not exhibit it; it had to be sold
from under the counter, like pornographic literature.
14. Cf. ZELLER,.GEIST DER FREHEST (1953) and the publications of the Institut fir Zeit-
geschichte (Mfinchen).
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Barth and his disciples, but those influenced by Emil Brunner's Justice (1943)
and his earlier Das Gebot und die Ordnungen - had returned to natural law
thinking because of the obvious substantive illegitimacy of Hitler's legality
and his open paganism. Thus ended the long estrangement of Protestant the-
ology from natural law.1 5
When, therefore, the first constituent assemblies of the Lander met, there
was almost unanimous sentiment in favor of strengthening the judiciary, of
creating a guardian of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the form of
a Constitutional Court - i.e., of establishing judicial review formally and ex-
plicitly - and of exempting the Bill of Rights from the amending power gen-
erally vested in a qualified majority of the legislature. The leading Socialist
member of the Bavarian Constituent Assembly, Dr. Wilhelm H6gner, said
during the discussions on the Bill of Rights: "We see these rights as a part of
the natural law, which. is older and stronger than the state and which will
again and again successfully and forcefully assert itself against the state. They
are valid as a higher law even though human folly has denied them." 16 Pro-
fessor Adolf Siisterhenn, who might be considered the Father of the Rhein-
land-Pfalz Constitution, said that "the judges of the Constitutional Court
when examining the constitutionality of a law ought to give effect not only
to the Constitution but also to the natural law." 17
Meanwhile, lower courts since 1945 were referring to natural law in their
decisions. Thus, the Wiesbaden Amtsgericht and the Frankfurt Landgericht
decided that laws which declared the property of Jews forfeited to the Reich
(Reichsleistungsgesetz, 1937) were in violation of the natural law and there-
fore void ab initio, a doctrine which the Federal Supreme Court affirmed with
respect to deprivation of liberty.' 8 These decisions were handed down on No-
vember 13, 1945, and June 30, 1946, before the constitution of the Land
Hessen was ratified on December 11, 1946.
Most of the constitutions drawn up in this intellectual climate after World
War II have broken with the pattern of constitutional thinking that obtained
after World War I (see above) and have incorporated direct references to
natural rights or natural law. Thus the Bavarian Constitution of December 2,
1946, speaks of the natural right of parents to educate their children (Art.
126); the Wiirttemberg-Baden Constitution says in Art. 1 that man should
15. Edgar Bodenheimer, Significant Developments in German Legal Philosophy since 1945,
3 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 379, 383 ff. (1954).
16. Quoted in CARL HEYLAND, DAS WIDERSTANDSRECHT DES VOLKES 113 (Tiibingen,
1950).
17. HEYLAND, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 114.
18. 2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOF IN STRAFSACHEN (hereafter quoted as
BGHST) 234. See below.
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develop himself for his own weal and for that of his fellow man; and the pre-
amble speaks of perpetual human rights. The Baden Constitution of May 22,
1947 (to be revived when and if the separation of Baden from Wiirttemberg-
Baden should be realized) speaks in the preamble of the principles of the
Christian moral law according to which the state should be organized, and
of inalienable sacred human rights which "are explicitly confirmed and pro-
tected by the Constitution." The Rheinland-Pfalz Constitution of May 18,
1947, speaks in Art. 1 of the natural right of man to the full development of
his person within the framework of the natural moral law; it says in para-
graph 3 of that article that public authority is founded on, and limited by,
the demands of the common good based on natural law. In Art. 23 it speaks
of the family as a community in its own natural right; in Art. 26 it refers to
the natural right of the parents to determine the education of their children;
and in Art. 60 it affirms that private property is a natural right, which the
state guarantees. The Bremen Constitution declares in Art. 1 that the legisla-
ture, the executive, and the judiciary are bound by the laws of morality and
humanity (Menschlichkeit).
The fundamental law (Grundgesetz, hereafter GG) of the West German
Federal State of May 23, 1949, declares in Art. 1 that the German people
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every
human community. It refers to these rights as "guaranteed," implying that
they are not the product of the constituent power. In Art. 6 the education
of children is declared to be the natural right of their parents. The rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights (Art. 1-20) are declared to be immediately
valid law binding on legislature, executive, and judiciary. Art. 19 expressly
states that in no case may the legislature violate the essential content of a fun-
damental right.
Art. 79 GG forbids any change by amendment of the Bill of Rights. As
already mentioned, this is in consonance with most of the Lander constitu-
tions. Thus the Rheinland-Pfalz Constitution states that bills of amendment
that concern the Preamble (this constitution furnishes a rare example of a
preamble of direct and immediate juridical relevance) or the rules of Art. I
(which are declared to be natural law) and Art. 74 (popular sovereignty,
democratic and social character of state and membership in the Federal Re-
public) are not permitted (Art. 129, par. 2). In a similar way do the consti-
tutions of Bavaria (Art. 75), Wiirttemberg-Baden (Art. 85), Bremen (Art.
20), Hesse (Art. 150), and Lower Saxony (Art. 37) limit the amending
power. In most cases, the Constitutional Court of the individual Land has the
ultimate decision concerning the application of these provisions, which in ef-
fect establish within the constitution a gradated system of rules and values.
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Thus the Bavarian and the Federal Constitutional Courts, as well as the Fed-
eral Supreme Court, have held that they may declare unconstitutional a lower
constitutional provision which is in violation of a higher provision (see below).
Indirectly, this authority is further supported by the provision contained in
GG and most Ldinder constitutions that the general rules of international law
are part of federal law, have precedence over the acts of the legislature and
bind immediately the inhabitants of the Federation (Art. 25, GG). This re-
jects the older "transformation theory." It makes available to the judiciary
and the Constitutional Court (which, according to Art. 100, par. 2, has the
ultimate decision) an additional substantive standard with regard to the legis-
lature, and through the European Convention on Human Rights it provides
an additional confirmation of the immediately binding character of the rules
of the Bill of Rights. It must be remembered that all these limitations on the
amending power are necessary because the constitutions generally follow the
usual continental practice of vesting the ordinary amending power in a quali-
fied majority of the legislature.
The general revival of natural law, the universal abhorrence of the mis-
deeds of a regime that "made injustice a system," and this distinction of rank
among the provisions of constitutions produced as a necessary consequence the
explicit establishment of judicial review. 19 In more general ways also, the ju-
dicial power of government, "'en quelque faqon nulle," as Montesquieu said,
rose to full equality with the legislature and the executive, and there is already
some fear that it has risen above them. 20 I do not intend to assert that the
recognition of natural law by the judiciary is only possible where there exists
a kind of superiority of the judiciary or a system of judicial review. What is
necessary to see is that if legislative acts are the only depositories of law, and
"law" is only a formal term open to any content, and if the judiciary is help-
lessly bound by such a concept of "law," then there is scarcely an occasion
for the judiciary to appeal to natural law. Now such a concept of law is re-
pudiated by the new constitutions, in most cases explicitly. For some declare
that the judges are subject to the constitution, to the law, and to their con-
sciences (Art. 121, Rheinland-Pfalz Constitution), or to law and right (Recht)
(Art. 20, GG); Recht is then a broader term and contains also suprapositive
19. That this review was then reserved to special constitutional courts is again a peculiarity
of continental legal thinking.
20. Cf., for instance, HANS SCHNEIDER, GERICHTSFREIE HOHEITSAKTE 28 ff. (Tiibingen,
1951). Others warn of the danger of a gouvernement des juges, thus picking up the title
of Edouard Lambert's book published in 1921, which is a most violent critique of judicial
review. In 1947 Lambert warned his compatriots against the dangers of any form of judicial
review to their way of life. See his L'ANCETRE AMERICAIN DU DROIT COMPARi - LA Doc-
TRINE DU JUGE STORY (Paris, 1947). Cf. also WERNER WEBER, WEIMARER VERFASSUNG
UND BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 25 (1951).
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law or natural law.2 1 The quotation at the beginning of this essay from a re-
spected commentary on the Weimar Constitution presents today an untenable
doctrine.2 2
Before we present and comment on a series of decisions of the Federal Su-
preme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court, it should be pointed out
that these courts do not have the practice of publishing the voting on opinions,
or of publishing dissenting opinions, so that the individual judges stand in the
background and the impersonal institution in the foreground. Only insofar
as judges publish their ideas in some other way can one know which of them
is an adherent of the natural law. Thus the Presidents of the respective courts,
Dr. H. Weinkauff and Dr. J. Wintrich, are known by their scholarly writings
as devoted adherents of the natural law, whereas Dr. Katz, a member of the
Federal Constitutional Court, has uttered skeptical views, but in a noble way,
about natural law. If terms other than "natural law" occur in judicial deci-
sions, such as "suprapositive basic norms, .... suprapositive demands of natural
moral law," "material justice," "fundamental postulates of justice," "norms of
objective ethics," "the objective order of values," "universal agreement of all
civilized nations," it is clear from the context that in practically every case
the courts could as well have said natural law.
III
In the following pages certain significant decisions of both the Federal
Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Laws (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter
BGH) and the Federal Constitutional Court (BundesVerfassungsgericht, here-
after BVerfG) will be discussed; a task still to be done would be to peruse the
decisions of the Federal Supreme Court for Labor and Social Jurisdiction and
the Federal Administrative Court. The BGH handles general civil and crimi-
nal cases, in which natural law questions can arise in various ways. In the case
of the BVerfG we are less concerned with decisions concerning the relationship
between the executive and the legislature or the distribution of competencies
between the Federal state and the several Liinder than with cases of "consti-
tutional complaint," where an individual person accuses the Government in its
legislative and executive functions of infringing upon inviolable and guaran-
21. Cf. HERMAN VON MANGOLDT, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ (1953), especially his ob-
servations on Art. 20, on pages 131 ff., and the bibliography cited there; GERHARD BucK-
LINO, DER OBJEKTIVE RECHTSBEGRIFF (1950).
22. The Nordrhein-Westfalen Constitution in its initially proposed form declared that a
law was binding as long as it had been passed correctly according to the formal way of
legislation; the protest was instantaneous. Ernst von Hippel declared that this presented
"in principle unlimited tyranny." RHEINISCHER MERKUR, November 22, 1947.
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teed rights. It is in this latter class of cases that the Court acts in its capacity
as guardian of the supreme values which the Constitution either explicitly or
implicitly contains,2 3 among them right itself (Recht), an objective supreme
value with suprapositive content. In taking into account these "suprapositive
and suprapolitical fundamental values the court fulfills its specific function as
constitutional organ." (Wintrich.)
Let us take as our first case for discussion a BGH decision on a civil tort. 24
The plaintiff claimed damages from a Volkssturm commanding officer for the
illegal killing of a near relative. The defendant had not intervened to protect
a citizen who, having been arrested for hiding a non-Aryan person, had al-
legedly tried to flee; he was shot down by the driver of the officer's car, and,
lying gravely wounded, was killed by the driver without intervention of the
officer. The Court said in deciding for the plaintiff that the defendant was
liable for civil tort. The defendant relied on Art. 131 of the Weimar Consti-
tution and par. 839 of the Civil Code, which make the state primarily liable
for illegal or immoral (against gute Sitten) acts of a civil servant (Beamter)
under color of his office.2 5 But in this case the defendant is primarily and
directly liable, for Art. 131 does not go so far as to protect the official under
all circumstances. In this case he gravely violated his duties and revealed
by his acts that the life of a political opponent was of no value to him. He
thus violated in a morally objectionable way all principles of law (Recht) and
morality; he is, therefore, directly liable.
Another case decided at the same time involved the same commanding
officer. This time the victim was a young Volkssturm soldier who was absent
without leave. The officer had himself shot the man without any form of sum-
mary trial, and had ordered the corpse to be secretly buried, imposing strict
silence on the soldiers with him. In court he pleaded the defense of superior
orders since the Nazi county-leader had ordered him to kill (umlegen) this
soldier; he also appealed to the so-called Katastrophen-order of Hitler em-
powering any member of the armed forces to kill instantly any deserter, cow-
ard, or traitor. The Court found the defendant guilty of civil tort and made
him liable for damages to the mother of the slain soldier.
23. The technicalities of this "complaint" have been worked out satisfactorily. See JosEF
WINTRICH, AUFOABEN, WESEN, GRENZEN DER VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT, FESTSCHRIFT
NAWIASKY (1953); SCHUTZ DES GRUNDRECHTS DURCH VERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE...
(Regensburg, 1950). Cf. also HANS HUBER, DIE VERFASSUNGSBESCIWERDE (1954).
24. 3 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESOERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN (hereafter cited as
BGHZ) 94 (July 12, 1951).
25. These laws are intended, the Court said, first, to give better protection to those affected
by the act of the civil servant as representative of the administrative state, and, second, to
free the civil servant from overscrupulosity in his official acts due to fear of personal liability.
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Every killing of a human being is illegal and a grave violation of an offi-
cial's duties if it is not justified by a rule of law [Rechtsnorm]. The Kata-
strophen-order of Hitler ordering the execution without any form of trial
cannot be considered as a rule of law. First it was not promulgated in
the form of law that was then still valid (i.e., the Reichs-Anzeiger). The
opinion of some Nazi jurists that all in some way juridically relevant acts
of will of the Fiihrer which, according to their nature might be considered
as norms, should be equal to law and thus juridically binding without re-
gard to form, is a shameful self-surrender of all members of the legal com-
munity [Rechtsgemeinschaft], in favor of a despot. Such a theory cannot
be accepted as a "source of law" under the doctrine of the rule of law.
[The Court here quotes an earlier opinion of the German Supreme Court
of the British Zone (OBZSt 1, 321.)]
Now the Court could have settled the case on this formalist argument. But it
went on significantly:
Even if the Katastrophen-order had been promulgated in due form it
could not have become law [Recht]. For the positive legislative act is in-
trinsically limited. It loses all obligatory power if it violates the generally
recognized principles of international law or the natural law [Naturrecht],
or if the contradiction between positive law and justice reaches such an
intolerable degree that the law, as unrichtiges Recht, must give way to
justice.26 Even the Fiihrer-decree of February 15, 1945, on summary
trials before military courts (R.G.B1. I, 30) accepted the legal principle
that nobody may be deprived of his life without a trial before a court; this
is an inalienable human right. Thus the Katastrophen-order is null and
void; it is no rule of law; obedience to it is against the law [Recht]. The
claim of the defendant that he could not know this and that he acted ac-
cording to the order of his superior is unacceptable. He must be held to
know that no legal system permits a soldier to escape responsibility for an
infamous crime by relying on the order of a superior, if the latter's orders
are in stark contradiction to human morality and the laws of all civilized
nations, whatever differences in positive law might exist among them.
An opinion of January 29, 1952,27 dealt with the acquittal by a lower
court of members of the Gestapo who had participated in the mass arrests of
Jewish citizens and their deportation to the infamous death camps of Ausch-
witz and Theresienstadt. These officials were found not guilty of being acces-
26. This is taken verbatim from GUSTAV RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 353 (4th ed.
Erik Wolf), in connection with which Radbruch says: "Positivism has, as a matter of fact,
disarmed the German jurists against law of an arbitrary and criminal content." (p. 352)
See also RUDOLF STAMMLER, DIE LEHRE VOM RICHTIGEN REcHT (1926); ERICH KAUF-
MANN, KRITIK DER NEUKANTISCHEN RECHTSPHILO SOPHIE (1921).
27. 2 BGHST 234.
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sories to unlawful deprivation of liberty (kidnapping) and to murder. The
lower court had excused the defendants on subjective grounds, though it ac-
knowledged that objectively they had been accessories to the criminal acts.
Subjectively, the lower court held, it could not be assumed that the accused
had certain knowledge of the murderous intentions of the principal criminals
(Hitler, G6ring, Himmiler, Heydrich) nor that they had the consciousness of
doing wrong, since they thought that their acts were in agreement with the
law valid at that time; neither had they knowledge of sentence by indepen-
dent courts or formal accusations of other Gestapo officers for arbitrary ar-
rests; and although they conceded that they had an "unclear feeling that these
arrests and deportations were unjust acts against these Jews, they were not
aware that in their official activity they were violating a law valid at that
time." The Supreme Court refused to accept these arguments and declared
that their logical consequence would be that the accused could have consid-
ered anything as lawful that the Nazi State did or ordered to be done in po-
litical matters, a doctrine which in these general terms is clearly untenable.
The liberty of a state to determine what is lawful or not within its terri-
tory may be considered as very broad, but it is not unlimited. In the con-
sciousness of all civilized nations we find (despite all the differences of
their legal systems) a common nucleus of law [Recht] which, according
to the universal juridical convictions of all men, may not be violated by
any legislative or other act of political authority. This nucleus contains
certain basic norms of human actions considered as inviolable; they have
been found by all civilized nations by reason of common basic moral in-
sight [Anschauung] and are thus considered valid, though an individual
norm of an individual state may seem to be violating them. The decree
of February 28, 1933,28 against Communist violent acts dangerous to the
state could by no reasonable person be considered as an unlimited author-
ity for the Gestapo to violate that nucleus of norms which, according to
the juridical convictions of all no legislative or other authoritative act of
any state may violate. It is a fundamental fault of the lower court that
in its decision it did not take into consideration these limitations on arbi-
trariness valid everywhere and at all times. 2 9 That the accused should not
have known these few basic norms necessary for human living together -
these fundamental norms of justice related to the dignity of the human
person - or that they should have misjudged the obligatory character of
these norms independent of all positive acknowledgment by authority,
28. This was the infamous decree passed after the Nazi-inspired and -managed fire of the
Reichstag Building, according to Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution; it was used more
against Jews, Christians, and Socialists than against Communists. Under this decree the
writer was put in "protective custody" during July, 1933.
29. This is obviously an allusion to the validity of natural law: "ubique, semper, et ab
omnibus observatur."
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and that they should have accepted instead an authoritatively directed in-
justice, regarding the latter as law [Recht] cannot be taken seriously.
One has only to consult any ancient or modern treatise on natural law in or-
der to see that what the Court here referred to are those basic norms which
for many centuries have been called natural law.
Similar ideas were expressed in the so-called Canaris case (BGHSt 2, 173).
Admiral Canaris and other members of resistance groups were, by order of
Hitler, hanged on April 5, 1945, after a farce of a summary procedure by
an SS tribunal. They had not yet been declared guilty by the infamous Volks-
gerichtshof in a formal trial. An SS colonel and other officials of the SS
(RSHA) served as accusers; the colonel was later accused as an accessory to
murder. The lower court found him not guilty because, first, Canaris and his
fellow prisoners had been at least formally guilty of high treason on the basis
of the laws and decrees of the Nazi state then in power and, second, because
at least a kind of juridical "face" had been put on the killing by the perfunc-
tory trial before the SS tribunal. The Supreme Court rejects this opinion and
states:
It is not unjust when in times of grave necessity and danger to the state
the ordinary procedural rights of accused persons are limited to a few
rules, in contrast to procedures in times of peace. But if the victims were
deprived of their lives in a form that was not even covered by the then
valid decrees, or that violates universally binding rules of law which are
valid and binding per se, independently of any positive recognition by the
state, and if the accused knew this - which is to be implied since he con-
ceded that the Hitler order to murder Canaris and the others had already
been in his hands and that consequently the summary procedure served
only as a kind of "legal face" - then the accused is guilty as an accessory
to murder. [The death penalty imposed according to the then valid de-
crees on summary procedures] presupposes a bonafide procedure, not such
a one as preserves only the external fiction of a procedure. It belongs to
the very nature of a juridical sentence that it be passed by independent
judges not bound by any orders of a superior; that it be the result of their
free juridical consciences; and that it be based on a procedure which in se
is apt to produce objective truth, to find guilt or innocence and to judge
according to the measure of guilt, so that on the result of the procedure
alone rests the decision which the judges have to pronounce according to
their consciences. 3 0 A sham procedure is no such procedure, neither in
name nor in substance. The rulers of the Nazi state have often, as every-
30. As already pointed out, in the Constitution of Rheinland-Pfalz of May 17, 1947, Art.
121 states that "the judges are subject only to the constitution, the law, and their con-
sciences." Cf. Hans Peters, Das Gewissen des Richters und das Gesetz, in GEGENWARTS-
PROBLEME DEs RECHTS (Neue Folge, 1950).
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one knows, issued decrees that claimed to posit law [Recht] or to be in
agreement with law [Recht]. Nevertheless they lacked the nature of law
because they violated these fundamental legal principles which, indepen-
dent of the recognition by the State, are valid. Acts of authority which
are not even intended to serve justice, which violate knowingly the prin-
ciples of equality before the law, and which gravely violate the legal con-
victions of all civilized nations on the value and dignity of the human
person, can never produce valid law; and acts of an officer of law accord-
ing to such decrees are and remain unjust [Unrecht]. The lower court
has completely misrepresented the nature of law, which is the opposite of
arbitrariness, and the nature of the judicial decision.
Another illustration of this principle is furnished by the decision on the
restitution of the property of Jews that was unjustly confiscated upon their
forced emigration. 3 1 A law on citizenship in connection with the so-called
Nuremberg anti-Semitic legislation of 1935 declared that German citizens of
Jewish origin who lived at that time outside the country or in the future fled
or emigrated would automatically lose their German citizenship and their
property would be forfeited to the State. After the war many claimed the
restoration of property thus illegitimately confiscated. The court recognized
these claims and said:
These laws of confiscation, though clothed in the formal rules of the le-
gality of a law, cannot be considered as a genuine Rechts-norm as to con-
tent. For these laws were intended solely to deprive of their property
those who were already in an illegitimate way ["rechtswidrig"] persecuted
and thus forced to emigrate. This is an extremely grave violation of the
suprapositive principle of equality before the law as well as of the supra-
positive guarantee of property (Art. 153 Weimar Const.) 32 The equality
principle is the foundation of any legal order [Rechtsordnung] and must
remain inviolable also for the constituent power, because of its supraposi-
tive rank. [This refers to the fact that Hitler and his cabinet in the Second
Empowering Act had by resolution of the by then wholly nazified Parlia-
ment received the competency to change old and to establish new consti-
tutional law. Consequently these provisions of the citizenship law] were
and are by reason of their unjust content [Unrechtsgehalt] and their vio-
lation of the basic demands of any legal order null and void; this law
31. 16 BGHZ 350 (February 28, 1955).
32. The positivist commentators (cf. Anschiitz, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 397 ff.) recognized
that this article contained an "Institutsgarantie," namely, that even the legislator could not
abolish the "legal institution" of private property. But what of the qualified majority of
the legislature as manifestation of the constituent power? Is this also bound by this "Insti-
tutsgarantie"? This question was scarcely discussed under the circumstances. Anyway, the
commentators would never have spoken of a suprapositive institution.
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could not, even at and during the time of the Nazi regime, produce any
legitimate legal effect [Rechtswirkungen]. [italics in the original]
The Court, in rejecting unjust acts of the Nazi government, does not fall
into the opposite kind of extreme formalism that would have it that every law
or decree passed by the Nazi State is ipso facto tainted or invalid irrespective
of its content. This - the converse of the view of the positivist jurists, to
whom, without regard to content, all laws that formally emanate issue from
whatever form of political authority are valid - is also repudiated by the
Court, which knows that, besides the form, and independent of it, the legiti-
macy - as distinguished from mere formal legality - of laws and decrees
rests on "materielle Gerechtigkeit," i.e., on the conformity of their content to
the natural law. This the Court explains lucidly in a decision of February 8,
1952. 3 3 In principle the formal validity of legal rules depends on the consti-
tutional norms valid at the time of their being passed.
The particularities of the form of legislation characteristic of the Fiihrer-
principle do not invalidate in se and per se all the acts of this form of
legislation without regard to their content. Once the dictatorship has es-
tablished itself and finds external conformity, then legal norms enacted
according to the specific nature of dictatorship cannot be considered as
in se invalid. The new form of government, even though it came into ex-
istence under breach of previous constitutional law, must be considered as
legal. That is in accordance with natural law. Though the mere fact of
usurpation of political power cannot ex se produce subsequently (by the
mere fact of external conformity of the citizens) its legitimacy, the legally
relevant fact of the establishment of the new constitution and its actual
care for the common good may serve as a subsequently developing legiti-
macy. [The Court refers explicity to Johannes Messner, Das Naturrecht,
second edition, 1950, page 496.] 34 Hitler and his party gained full power,
acquiescence and aid from the people and international recognition (cf.
Judgment of Military Tribunal Nr. III, U.S.A., Nuremberg 3-4 Decem-
ber 1947). When Hitler later abused this unlimited plenitude of power
through oppression and criminal acts, there was ground for a denial of
legal recognition to these unjust acts; these may have been just cause for
active resistance and overthrow of the regime; but this cannot change the
fact that the Hitler regime, as long as it was in power, was legally com-
petent to posit legally valid laws and decrees. This does not mean that all
of them were - in the true meaning of the word - "Recht" if and in-
sofar as in their content they violated the commands of natural law or the
universally valid moral laws of Christian Western civilization. 3 5
33. 5 BGHZ 76.
34. An English edition under the title SOCIAL ETHICS (B. Herder Book Company, 1951).
35. Italics in the original.
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Thus, in a lawsuit involving the claim of a civil servant to a pension, it
was held that service under the absolute monarchy, the Weimar Republic, and
the Nazi regime could all be counted in the establishment of such a right, so
long as the particular claimant had not lent himself to unjust acts of the re-
gime.3 6
In a decision of November 16, 1953, not involving Nazi legislation, we find
also arguments from substantive equity and from distributive justice.3 7 Plain-
tiff asked for indemnification for a radio requisitioned by the mayor of X by
order of an American officer, to be turned over to a victim of a concentration
camp. It was stolen from the latter, and the original owner sued the mayor
for the value. The owner won his case, but before he received payment the
currency reform took place, which created a new mark and ordered that
money claims, with certain enumerated exceptions such as wages, pensions,
and rents under a lease, should be paid in the ratio of one mark new currency
for ten marks old currency. The question was whether the owner should re-
ceive compensation according to this ratio. The two senates in civil law dis-
agreed; so the decision went to the so-called Great Senate, i.e., both senates
sitting and deliberating together. The decision went in favor of a ratio of 1: 1
because expropriation is an invasion of private property of such a character
that the resulting claim to compensation cannot justly be treated as a mere
money claim. The court said:
Expropriation is essentially a breach of the general guarantee of private
property of Art. 14 GG. This is only permissible for reasons of the public
weal, and even then full compensation is demanded by the rule of law
[Rechtsstaat]. Expropriation is a special sacrifice that is imposed upon the
proprietor actually in contradiction to the principle of equality before the
law. Thus his compensation must represent the true value of his property.
Only if the money offered as compensation corresponds to the value of
the property without regard to a meanwhile legislated currency reform can
the principle of equality be preserved; to grant only a compensation at
the schematic rate [provided by law] would be against this principle; for
expropriation is a compulsory act of public authority (not a voluntary act
of the expropriee) relating to a material good that in se is not subject to
currency devaluation (in contradistinction to money debts and credits, ob-
viously). To decide otherwise would be a grave violation of equity; and
the principle of distributive justice would also be unbearably violated,
especially since it has become clear meanwhile that this compensation ac-
cording to the rate 1: 1 cannot be considered as dangerous to the stability
of the currency.
36. 13 BGHZ 296.
37. 11 BGHZ 156 (163).
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We have seen that the GG and most of the Ldnder constitutions create
a gradation or hierarchy among constitutional principles when they exempt
the fundamental rights from the operation of the amending power. But the
courts have come to recognize that these natural rights are protected by more
than the positive provisions of the constitutions. They transcend all positive
law, even positive constitutional law, although, to avoid the continual threat
of turning fundamental rights into merely relative values, they are given ex-
plicit and solemn acknowledgment by the constitutions. 38
An encroachment by the legislature is permitted only when higher [iiber-
geordnete, emphasis in original] reasons of justice [Rechtsgriinde] justify
the encroachment, not for reasons of political expediency. In this regard,
it must always be remembered that in the gradated order of the GG
these fundamental rights are themselves the highest juridical values
[Rechtswerte].39
It is not merely against amendment in accordance with the procedure set
up in the constitution that these rights are protected: they are limitations on the
original constituent power (Verfassungsgesetzgeher) itself.40 Thus, on the
question of whether the rights enumerated in the first 19 articles of the Fed-
eral Constitution are available to invalidate formally valid dispositions made
before the Constitution was adopted, the Supreme Court has this to say:
They are referred to in the GG as inviolable and inalienable human
rights (Art. 1, 2) ; not as granted by the Constitution, but as existing be-
fore it and independently of it .... Not even anterior law can be applied
if it violates them. ... The GG obliges every judge to acknowledge the
suprapositive [iibergesetzlich] rank of the genuine fundamental rights.
That compels him to the juridical conclusion that these rights were valid
always even before [emphasis in the original] the GG was formally or-
dained; they were thus juridically valid also during the rule of the Nazi
regime.4 1
In the recognition of fundamental rights of limiting the constituent power,
a leading role, along with that of the two highest Federal courts, was taken
by the Bavarian Constitutional Court, whose first President, Dr. Josef Win-
trich, is now President of the Federal Constitutional Court. The Bavarian
38. BGH decision of October 17, 1955, 8 VERWALTUNGSRECIITSPRECHUNO 98 if.), 3
BVERFG 135. Cf. Bavarian Constitutional Court (Bayr. Verf. Gericht) 1 II 29; 4 II 51 ff.;
9 II III in ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BAYERISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFES.
39. Ibid., decision of October 17, 1955.
40. 2 BVERvG 51.
41. Advisory opinion 11 BGHZ 81 with regard to 6 BGHZ 208.
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Court has held that "the right of respect for human dignity is an uncondition-
al pre- and suprapolitical right [vor- und iiberstaatliches Recht]," 4 2 and that:
The Bavarian Constitution sees in the elementary fundamental rights
natural rights antecedent to positive law and due to all men. These rights
are insurmountable limitations on all public authority, including the con-
stituent power.4 3
Pursuant to these principles, the Bavarian Constitutional Court asserted
the power to invalidate an express provision of its own Constitution:
There exist such constitutional principles, which are so elementary and to
such a degree an expression of right anteceding also the Constitution it-
self, that they bind the constituent power itself, so that other constitutional
rules which have not the high rank of such principles may be declared
null and void if they contradict these principles. 4 4
The case concerned Art. 184 of the Bavarian Constitution, which says
that the "validity of laws, directed against National Socialism and Militarism
or which are intended to do away with their consequences, is not touched or
limited by this Constitution." The Court said:
If the intent of this article were, with regard to the so-characterized group
of people thus characterized, to free the legislature forever from the re-
strictions placed on it by Constitution and justice, i.e., to put this group
forever beyond the protection of Constitution and justice, then this article
would be void as contravening the idea of justice, the principle of the rule
of law [Rechtsstaat], the principle of equality before the law, and the fun-
damental rights which are a direct expression of the human person.
The decision of March 14, 1951, repeats and refines this dictum: 4 5
The constituent power, too, is bound by the Recht which in its very es-
sence and meaning should serve the moral values of human dignity, of
justice and thus of liberty. All public authority - and thus also the con-
stituent power - is limited by the idea of Recht. Only if one presupposes,
in agreement with extreme legal positivism, that the constituent power is
the sole creator of Recht in the sense of an enforceable order with any
content, may one criticize the earlier decision of the Court .... The Ba-
42. On the Bavarian 'Constitutional Court, cf. Josef Wintrich, Die Rechtsprechung des
Bayerischen Verfassungsgerichtsholes, 4 REcHT, STAAT UND WIRTSCHAFT 139-170 (1953).
43. Id. at 141. Wintrich remarks that a dissenting member said that his standpoint of
legal positivism made him dissent because of this enlargement of judicial review beyond
the written Constitution; this is an argumentum e contrario for natural law.
44. 3 ENTSCHEED. VERF. G. 28 (Bavaria).
45. 4 ENTSCHEM. VERF. G. 51.
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varian Constitution itself recognizes the dignity of the human person, and
equality before the law as substantive justice, as human rights antecedent
to all positive law. It recognizes that the constituent power did not create
these rights but found them. These highest principles of Recht and of sub-
stantive justice [materielle Gerechtigkeit] limit the sovereignty of the con-
stituent power.4 6
It is clear from the whole tenor of these opinions that the Court is accept-
ing the classical natural law doctrine in holding both the constituent and the
amending powers to be subject to limitations.47
The Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court have
accepted the doctrine announced in these decisions. The former said in an
advisory opinion to the Federal Constitutional Court that a reference to "un-
constitutional norms in the Constitution" is not a contradiction in terms when
the Constitution contains positive norms of lower and of higher rank, as is
the case with the GG (Art. 79) or when the norms of higher rank, such as the
fundamental rights, are recognized as suprapositive rules, not created but
merely recognized by the Constitution:
That a constitutional provision may be void is not illogical for the reason
that it is itself part of the Constitution. There are constitutional rules
which are so much the expression of Recht antecedent to the Constitution
itself that they bind the constitution maker himself. Thus other provisions
of a lower rank may be declared null and void, because they contravene
these higher ranking norms. There are once and for all certain constitu-
tional norms which have supralegislative and even supraconstitutional
rank, norms which the Constitution merely recognizes but does not create.
The opposite opinion cannot be accepted, for it contends that the con-
stituent power is wholly autonomous in establishing the value system of
the Constitution. This denial of suprapositive Recht binding upon the
constituent power would make a constitution-maker rechtsmdssig, as if he
intended only to legalize an arbitrary and tyrannical regimed and thus make
it binding on the judiciary.48
The Federal Constitutional Court said in an opinion concerning the prin-
ciple of equality before the law:
The idea that the original constituent power may ordain anything accord-
ing to mere will would be a relapse into the spirit of a value-free legal
46. In a decision of January 19, 1956, the Court, despite all criticism, reaffirmed this doc-
trine. 7 ENTSCHEID. 55.
47. The opponents of the doctrine announced by the Court either are ordinary positivists
or follow the "legal existentialism" of Carl Schmitt, whose "decisionism" and antinorma-
tivism have gained more and more followers recently.
48. 11 BGHZ 2, advisory opinion according to par. 80, BVGG.
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positivism which has been overcome in recent juridical science and prac-
tice.49 Experience under the Nazi regime has taught that even the legis-
lator may posit injustice, and that, consequently, the ordinary adminis-
tration of justice should be armed against a possible development of simi-
lar regimes so that, in the extreme case, it may be able to give effect to
the principle of substantive justice [materielle Gerechtigkeit] in preference
to the principles of the security and certainty of the legal order. . . . To
determine what a lower constitutional rule is and if it is in contravention
of a higher rule, to determine if the constituent power has kept within the
ultimate limitations established by justice, is the privilege and responsibility
of the judiciary, which draws its authority not only externally, as it were,
from the Constitution but also from the idea of Right [Recht] itself.50
The two Federal courts regard the principle of equality before the law -
or its negative formulation, the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination - as
part of the "suprapositive" law [Recht]. This principle of equality must not
be confused with the "schematic" equality (Wintrich) which would have it,
for instance, that socially relevant differences such as being the head of a
family, a worker, or a millionaire, cannot affect the right to vote. The supra-
positive principle binding on the legislature is that
Facts and circumstances [Tatbestdnde] of the same kind, which by rea-
son of the nature of the matter, clearly demand in justice regulation on
the basis of equality, must not, without objective and sufficient cause, and
without regard for the demands of justice, be treated unequally; in this
sense equals must be handled equally, unequals unequally. 51
Few will doubt that by terms "suprapositive law," "material or substan-
tive justice," "prepolitical rights," etc., natural law and natural rights in the
commonly accepted sense are meant. It is also clear that these terms are in-
49. The opinion quotes with approval the Swiss jurist Hans Marti (FESTOABE FUR DEN
SCHWEIZER JURISTENVEREIN) on sources of law in Swiss law: "In each constitution definite
values find their realization. . . . A constituent power does not create a constitution out
of nothing. It does not 'invent' new values but it finds these or other values already ac-
cepted. . . .. These values and norms which it finds are by no means only moral norms
without juridical relevance. Insofar as these norms claim a realization in the law (Recht)
they are not merely ethical rules but already juridical principles (Rechtsgrundstze). Thus
they are above the constitution and the constituent power norms which seek recognition
in positive law; they are principles of the rules of positive law."
50. 3 BVERFG 231. It should be pointed out that the Constitutional Courts of some
Lander do not claim such a broad competency. Cf. BACHOFF, VERFASSUNOSWIDRIGE VER-
FASSUNGSNORMEN? 12 ff. (1951).
51. 11 BGHZ 26; 16 BGHZ 350; 6 BGHST 168; 3 BVERFG 135; and J. WINTRICH,
DIE VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT. . . , a lecture at the Academy of Administration and
Economics, October 17, 1955, p. 2. See also Drig, Gleichheitsgrundsatz. . . , 79 ARcsuv
FUR OFFENTLICnES RECHT (1953-1954). The Bavarian Constitutional Court has been and
is exemplary in this subject matter. See WINTRICH, RECHTSPRECHUNO DES BAYR. VERF.G.
143 (1953).
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tended to designate immediately valid and thus judicially applicable law, not
merely ethical standards and not merely regulatory principles or directives for
the legislator.
This becomes clear in a decision of the Federal Supreme Court in which
the relationship between the moral law and the judicial norm is discussed,
and the strict separation between the two, so stressed ever since the time of
Immanuel Kant, is criticized. The case arose under par. 181 of the Criminal
Code, making it an offense for a person to permit or tolerate acts of sexual
immorality (Unzucht) in his house by his child or someone to whom he stands
in loco parentis. In this particular case, a mother permitted her daughter, who
had had an affair with an older married man, and was pregnant by him, to
live with him in her house, because they were "practically married." Since
1945, the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgerichte) has been tending to inter-
pret Unzucht in terms of the moral convictions of the classes of society (Volks-
kreise) in which the acts complained of took place. Under the conditions that
have prevailed in some parts of the German population since the War, it is
quite possible that this criterion could warrant an acquittal in this particular
case. At any rate, the Court of Appeals of Diisseldorf so held.52
The criterion thus adopted - one reminiscent, incidentally, of the socio-
logical school of jurisprudence in this country -denies an objective, gener-
ally valid, and obligatory order of values; instead, the judges substitute the
changing opinions and behavior of changing strata of society which they
scarcely can safely determine and of which they do not know whether they
are backed by moral convictions or are merely the result of indifference. A
deference to sane popular views is no solution, for the judge has to decide if
a certain popular view is still sane or not. Without an objective standard the
decisions of the judges must become arbitrary and subjective. The Court of
Appeals simply refused to take issue with the various views, contending that
it does not belong to the obligation of judges to decide about problems of
ethics, since all these various views had their own moral justification. "This
view," says the Supreme Court,
cannot be right. It surrenders the very grave question full of far-reaching
consequences which moral norm ought to rule, the relation between the
sexes, especially between engaged couples, to an empty relativism, destruc-
tive in effect because only social reality without any evaluation serves as
a standard. This simply means that human actions ought not to be ruled
by norms but that these actions determine the norms .... The thesis that
judicial decision must in principle never be based on ethical evaluations
52. NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 959 (1950).
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is a deplorable falsehood. The inner obligatory power of the juridical law
[Recht] is, on the contrary, based just upon its agreement with the moral
law. The norm on which paragraph 181 of the criminal code rests is not
a transitory convention; it is a norm of the moral law valid in se. Such
norms are valid without regard to the changing views of the addressees,
of their consent or dissent.
There is no doubt that the norms which regulate fundamentally the sex-
ual relations and thus ordain the order of marriage, family, and remotely
the living together of the people as obligatory norms are norms of the
moral law and not transitory conventional customs .... Since the moral
law prescribes monogamous marriage and the family as obligatory form
of living together and makes them the basis of the life of nations and
states, it simultaneously prescribes that sexual intercourse ought to take
place only in marriage and that a violation of this rule is a grave viola-
tion of sexual morality.... Therefore one cannot say that the seriousness
of the betrothal, the sincere will to marry is for itself alone an excuse from
the moral law; for the unconditional validity of the ethical norm does not
permit any exceptions.53
IV
In the preceding pages a selection of representative opinions of both the
Federal Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Laws and the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has been presented. Perhaps the opinions of the Federal Supreme
Courts in Labor and Social Law and of the Federal Supreme Court in Ad-
ministrative Law might have enriched this essay. But even so it is quite evi-
dent that the revival of natural law in Germany is a concern not primarily of
legal philosophers and professors of jurisprudence, but of judges. Some may
try to explain this revival merely as a consequence of the terrible trauma that
the National Socialist totalitarian Fiihrer-State inflicted on the judicial power
of government, quelque fason nulle - and totally nulle in the totalitarian
state where it is a mere tool of the legally and ethically unlimited power. But
such an explanation would be not only superficial but also somewhat insulting.
The idea of natural law never did wholly disappear; it was forced perhaps,
in Dr. Wu's happy phrase, to "go underground" or else to find refuge where,
for specific reasons, it was always "at home," in the Catholic Church and its
members. 5 4 Nevertheless, it may be said that the shock of the experience of
53. Emphasis in the original. 6 BGHST. 46. The Court points out that the Nazi racial
legislation, which forbade unjustly and arbitrarily marriages on racial discriminatory
grounds, could offer an exception; but then these laws were themselves unjust and could
not invalidate a serious marriage contract. This is in agreement also with canon law
(C.I.C., c. 1098, 1); see also 6 BGH 147 (suicide).
54. Cf. NATHANAEL MICKLEM, NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
173 (London, 1939), on Catholic resistance against the totalitarian state by reason of a
consistent theory of natural law.
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the totalitarian "injustice as a system" (Unrecht als System) made it appar-
ent even to those who had been satisfied with a concededly excellent and
learned legal technique, without giving much thought to the foundations of
law and rights, that all positive law, the constitutional included, rests on and
must be measured by an objective justice and a perennial jurisprudence. This
jurisprudence is valid in se, and in its essential content is independent of philo-
sophical fashions and transitory moods of legislative majorities.
The juridical, i.e., enforceable norm, even in its formal aspect, is not whol-
ly indifferent to content. This constitutes the inadequacy of the doctrine of
the "pure theory of law," which sees only the normative, the ordering ele-
ment, and the sociological guarantee of enforcement- in other words, norm
and power, the formal elements of the law (obedientia tacit imperantem).
Positive law implicitly demands justice for its content. It can claim to be valid
only insofar as it finds a free assent actu et habitu in the consciousness of those
subject to it. Obedience is a moral virtue, not merely an external response
to power, terror, or utilitarian expediency. It asks, as the virtue of free men,
for reason and reasons. The juridical law is, beyond all technicality and so-
ciological condition, related to ethical values as its content. As long as there
prevails in the community a habitual consensus about these values, one can
afford to be a positivist. But violent destruction by a revolution A la Hitler,
or sudden mass disobedience after a slow process of relativistic corruption by
irresponsible intellectuals, or any obvious contradiction between ethical values
and social reality, causes an awakening from this satisfaction with the
formal elements of the juridical order.
Besides these ethical values this order also contains and orders what Die-
trich Schindler calls "vital necessities" of man living in society, namely, to care
for his economic demands and to secure his life and that of his family for the
future in a peaceful order.5 5 While I cannot with certainty rely on obedi-
ence by others to the moral law, I can rely, because of the certainty of en-
forcement, on their external conformity to the juridical law as the "ethical
minimum" without which neither order nor internal peace could prevail.
This is also connected with the power element in the juridical positive law,
which leads to the temptation to see in the law nothing more than the pro-
tection of the social status quo of power. All these elements are characteristic
of the juridical law. In addition, in the periphery of the positive law, far away
from the nucleus of the perennial content, we find rules of expediency and
55. VERFASSUNGSRE HT UND SOZIALE STRUKTUR (2nd ed., ZUrich, 1944). It is interest-
ing that Wintrich, as well as his critic Peter Schneider in ARCHIV FUR RECITS- UND SO-
ZIALPHILOSOPHIE 98-110 (1956) (Naturrechtliche Stramungen in deutscher Rechtsprechung)
refers repeatedly to this master work.
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mere utility, the result not of any necessary radiation of the idea of justice,
but of a choice, among not even true alternatives, but rather among a plurality
of possibilities determined mostly by time and habit, of which one may be as
easily defended as another. Natural law, being the foundation and critical
norm of positive law, demands positive law; and positive law needs ethical
justification in the consciences of its subjects or it will be nothing more than
a labile power relation among social groups and individual and collective in-
terests.
The jurist in the daily technique of the law need not actually consider all
these matters, for they are, despite their innate tensions, implicitly accepted
in positive law. If, however, the tension, because of deep changes in the ha-
bitual consensus, becomes critical, there is a vital need of going to the funda-
mental and perennial principles of law. Positive law, then, needs the endur-
ing critic provided by natural law; it must forever be confronted by objective
justice. There is no intrinsic inherent antinomy between the perennial natu-
ral law and the time-and-nation-bound positive law characteristic of a given
time and place; but the ultimate appeal of all positive law and its legislators
is to the well-informed conscience -the depository of the natural law.
Needless to say, neither the opinions discussed above nor the appeals by
the courts to suprapositive law have escaped criticism. In this criticism, the
professed positivists, although they are the most vocal, are not alone. This is
all to the good. The natural law jurist is not safe from temptations, be they
those into which the jurists of the rationalist eighteenth century fell or those
into which the United States Supreme Court fell in the decades just before
and after 1900. Both temptations have been vehemently pointed out to the
German courts. In the matter of unconstitutional norms within the Consti-
tution a broad discussion ensued, although the two Courts were stressing that
such a thing was not unthinkable although rather improbable.5 6
The Courts are aware of the limitations on their authority, namely, that
they
ought not to take over strictly legislative functions, the free positing of ob-
jective legislation. The borderline for the judiciary in constitutional law
is where the political freedom of decision of Legislature and Executive
begin. Only such acts as fall into this sphere are 'unjustifiable govern-
mental acts' [justizlose Hoheitsakte].57 The principle of the separation of
56. Cf. pro: BACHOFF, VERFASSUNOSWIDRIGE VERFASSUNGSNORMEN? (with bibliography)
(1951); contra: HANS SCHNEIDER, GERICIHTSFREIE HO-EITSAKTE (1951), to mention only
two. See also Josef Wintrich, Aufgaben, Wesen, Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS NAWIASKY (Munich, 1955); Erich Kaufmann, Grenzen der Ver-
fassungsgerichtsbarkeit, VEREINGUNO DEUTSCH STAATSRECHTSLEHRER (1950).
57. Wintrich, op. cit. supra, note 56 at 204; Scheuner, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR SMEND 295.
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powers does not, as has often been said, so identify law with statutory
legislation as to prevent the development of judge-made law [Richter-
Recht], if the judiciary by the development of general principles of law
as they are given in the order of law [Rechtsordnung] finds norms ap-
plicable by the judiciary. On the other hand, it would be wrong for the
judiciary to attempt, by its own free resolution and will, to establish new
general norms for reasons of pure expediency or utility. The decisions of
the judiciary by their very nature must be restricted to law [Recht] that
can be judicially interpreted and/or concretized. 58
Chief Justice Wintrich points out in this connection that the "concretization
(by judicial decision) in the form of deriving more concrete norms from fun-
damental principles of law is more similar to the development of case law
than to mere technical interpretation of the law."5 9 This is a consequence
of judicial independence and the equality of the judiciary with the legislative
and the executive powers; and it is a slow approach to the judge-made law
familiar to the Anglo-American tradition. Insofar as the constitution is based
on, contains, or refers explicitly or implicitly to suprapositive norms or funda-
mental constitutive principles of the law itself, the judiciary is entitled in its
specific function of interpretation and concretization to appeal to universal
philosophical and ethical propositions, to an objective order of values tran-
scending all positive law. All political authority, and thus also the constituent
power, is, like all human power, limited immanently by the idea of justice, the
dignity of the human person, and its essentially social and political nature.
58. 11 BGHZ 35 (advisory opinion).
59. D IE VERFASSUNGSoERICHTSBARKEIT 10.
